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POVERTY AND ASPIRATIONS FAILURE*
Patricio S. Dalton, Sayantan Ghosal and Anandi Mani
We develop a theoretical framework to study the psychology of poverty and ‘aspirations failure’,
defined as the failure to aspire to one’s own potential. In our framework, rich and the poor persons
share the same preferences and same behavioural bias in setting aspirations. We show that poverty
can exacerbate the effects of this behavioural bias leading to aspirations failure and hence, a
behavioural poverty trap. Aspirations failure is a consequence of poverty, rather than a cause. We
specify the conditions under which raising aspirations alone is sufficient to help escape from a
poverty trap, even without relaxing material constraints.
The Chronic Poverty Report (2008–9) estimates that 320–443 million people live
trapped in chronic poverty: that is, these people remain poor for much or all of their
lives and their children are likely to inherit their poverty as well. An influential
literature on poverty traps argues that such persistent poverty is driven by constraints
that are external to the individual. Examples of such constraints are credit or insurance
market imperfections (Loury, 1981; Banerjee and Newman, 1991, 1993; Galor and
Zeira, 1993), coordination problems (Kremer, 1993), institutional or governmental
failures (Bardhan, 1997), malnutrition (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986), neighbourhood
effects (Hoff and Sen, 2005) or even the family system (Hoff and Sen, 2006).
An alternative view highlights the role of internal constraints in perpetuating poverty
traps. Behavioural biases or internal constraints such as myopia, lack of willpower and
lack of aspirations are often cited as traits that the poor likely suffer from.1 In an
influential contribution, anthropologist Arjun Appadurai argued that the poor may lack
the capacity to aspire and that policies that strengthen this capacity could help them to
‘contest and alter the conditions of their poverty’ (Appadurai, 2004, p. 59). Unlike
external constraints, it is not clear whether such internal constraints are the cause of
poverty – or its consequence. Do the poor become and remain poor because they lack
aspirations – or, in the words of Bertrand et al. (2004, p. 1), is it that ‘the poor may
exhibit the same basic weaknesses and biases as do people from other walks of life,
except that in poverty [. . .] the same behaviours [. . .] lead to worse outcomes’?
* Corresponding author: Anandi Mani, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4
7AL, UK. Email: a.mani@warwick.ac.uk.
We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also
grateful to participants at the University of Bath and Universidad del Rosario seminars, Warwick Workshop
on Aspirations and Poverty, CAGE workshop on Inequality, the CESIFO Summer Institute on Behavioral
Welfare Economics, the Annual Meetings of the AAEP, the RES meetings and the UNU-WIDER conference
on Poverty and Behavioral Economics for their feedback. Special thanks go to Daniel Aromi, Doug
Bernheim, Maria Cubel, Sharun Mukand, Sendhil Mullainathan, Jens Prufer and Vijayendra Rao for useful
discussions and suggestions. S. Ghosal and P. Dalton acknowledge support from ESRC-DFID grant RES-167-
25-0364. Any remaining error is responsibility of the authors.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1 Data from the World Values Survey show that 60% of Americans think that the poor are lazy or lack
willpower (Alesina et al., 2001).
[ 165 ]
TheEconomic Journal,126 (February), 165–188.Doi:10.1111/ecoj.12210©2014TheAuthors.TheEconomicJournalpublishedby JohnWiley&SonsLtdonbehalf
of Royal Economic Society. Published by John Wiley & Sons, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
In this study, we examine this latter view of internal constraints and poverty traps
rigorously. To understand the psychology of poverty and low aspirations, we study a
behavioural bias (or ‘internal constraint’) that individuals, whether rich or poor, may
suffer from in setting their aspirations: while they recognise that setting higher
aspirations will spur greater effort, they fail to realise that the effort level they choose
also influences their aspirations (via realised outcomes). As Aldous Huxley puts it:
‘every ceiling, when reached, becomes a floor’. In other words, individuals take
aspirations as given, when in fact, aspirations and effort are jointly determined.
We consider a world in which both the rich and the poor suffer from such a bias.
However, poverty imposes additional external constraints on the poor that exacerbate
the adverse effects of the behavioural bias in setting aspirations. Such constraints are
not just about initial wealth, they include other correlates of poverty that make it
harder for the poor to achieve a given outcome, be it less influential contacts or less
access to relevant information. We capture the effect of such constraints by assuming
that an individual’s final wealth is proportional to his initial wealth. In other words,
other things equal, the poor have to make a greater effort than the rich to achieve the
same level of final wealth. We have chosen to work with this reduced-form
representation of external constraints because our focus here is on aspirations. We
show that external constraints make the poor more susceptible to an aspirations
failure: they are more likely to choose a low level of aspiration and effort relative to the
best outcome they could have achieved, where low aspirations lead to low effort which,
in turn, reinforces low aspirations.
Our formulation of aspirations failure is based on three premises well-grounded in
the behavioural economics literature, as well as in evidence from across the social
sciences. First, a person’s aspiration level is a reference point that affects his utility from
any realised outcome. Higher aspiration could spur greater effort but it could also
adversely affect his satisfaction from a particular outcome (i.e. loss relative to a higher
reference point).
Our second key premise is that an individual’s aspirations and effort are jointly
determined in equilibrium. This is because there is a two-way feedback from effort to
aspirations: higher aspirations induce greater effort which, in turn, reinforces high
aspirations, through the outcome realised.2
Our third key premise concerns the decision-making process itself. Even though
aspirations and effort are jointly determined at a solution of the decision-problem, we
assume that individuals take aspirations as given when choosing effort. In other words,
we study individuals who fail to internalise the feedback from effort to aspirations. This
behavioural bias in the decision-making process is the source of an aspirations failure.
While both the poor and the rich are equally afflicted by such a bias, the more
stringent external constraints that the poor face make them more susceptible to an
aspirations failure. The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Think of two
behavioural decision-makers who have the same initial aspirations level, one rich and
the other poor. At this given aspirations level, the poor person would optimally choose
a lower effort level than the rich one, because his lower wealth reduces his marginal
2 Stutzer (2004) provides evidence from survey data that the higher the current achievement of an
individual is, the higher is her aspirations.
© 2014 The Authors.
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benefit from effort. However, the feedback from effort to aspirations implies that the
lower effort of the poor person will cause his aspiration level to diverge from that of the
rich person. In equilibrium, the poor person has two reasons to put in low effort: not
only are his net benefits lower, his aspiration level, which determines the marginal
benefit of effort in equilibrium, is lower as well. We note that the model does not
describe a case where poverty lowers the probability that a person achieves the
outcome that he aspires for. “Rather, poverty lowers the aspirations’ level of a poor
person, relative to what he could optimally aim to achieve”. This is what we refer to as
an aspirations failure. In this sense, poverty curtails a poor person’s capacity to aspire,
in the spirit of Appadurai (2004).
At this point, it is important to clarify two aspects of the modelling approach we use
in this study. Arguably, the motivation offered above suggests some adaptive dynamic
mechanism in which aspirations at any given time adapt to the effort chosen in the past
via the outcome realised. It turns out, however, from a modelling viewpoint, all that is
needed is a (static) model in which individuals take aspirations as given when choosing
effort, while aspirations and effort are required to be consistent (i.e. aspirations are
equal to the final outcome given effort) at a solution to the individual’s decision-
problem.
Second, we adopt an explicit normative benchmark to provide a welfare evaluation
of the outcomes of an individual’s decision-problem. It is the solution to a decision-
problem where the individual takes into account the two-way feedback between effort
and aspirations when he chooses between consistent effort–aspirations pairs. In our
model, ignoring the feedback from effort to aspirations creates the scope for multiple
welfare ranked (behavioural) equilibria. Further, initial external constraints (lower
wealth) determine the likelihood of ending up at a low effort–low aspirations (and
hence low outcome) equilibrium. We call such a situation a behavioural poverty trap.
Two types of poverty traps emerge from our analysis: standard poverty traps that are
driven solely by external constraints but also behavioural poverty traps characterised by
low effort and low aspirations. While external constraints imposed by poverty make
internal constraints more consequential, the latter becomes an independent source of
disadvantage in behavioural poverty traps. Our model suggests that, for some range of
initial wealth, it is possible to break a poverty trap by altering aspirations alone.
Therefore, policy approaches that influence aspirations among the poor are essential
to break this latter kind of trap.
This article contributes to an emerging literature that formally models how
aspirations influence economic outcomes. Ray (2006) provides a discussion of how
socially determined aspirations contribute to poverty persistence: this is the starting
point of our article. A related paper is Genicot and Ray (2014) which models
aspirations as socially determined reference points via exogenously specified aspiration
windows. Other closely related papers on aspirations include Stark (2006) and
Bogliacino and Ortoleva (2013). These papers have the feature that aspirations are
purely socially determined; they also have a macroeconomic emphasis, examining how
aspirations affect income distribution and growth. Our approach is complementary to
these papers: we examine how an individual’s own internal (psychological), rather
than social, constraints shape aspirations, and hence outcomes.
© 2014 The Authors.
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Our study relates to recent work that reflects a growing recognition of the role that
such internal constraints in perpetuating poverty. For instance, in her Tanner lectures,
Duflo (2012) talks about how a lack of hope among the poor can affect aspirations and
hence, behaviour.3 A second distinct channel that has been studied is the adverse
impact of poverty on individual cognitive function, because being preoccupied with
financial worries reduces mental resources available for other tasks (Mani et al., 2013).
This emerging body of work highlights an important lacuna in anti-poverty policy: a
failure to appreciate the role of constraints internal to individuals in perpetuating
poverty.4
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 motivates our focus on
poverty and aspirations failure, presents the formal model and examines the channel
through which poverty increases the likelihood of an aspirations failure. Section 2
outlines the conditions under which poverty traps may emerge due to internal, rather
than external constraints and discusses the welfare and policy implications of our
analysis. Section 3 concludes. Appendix A provides the proofs of all results, Appendix
B shows two examples of value functions consistent with our framework and Appendix
C presents two possible extensions of our model.
1. Aspirations and Poverty
Our motivation to examine the link between poverty and aspirations failure via internal
constraints arises from two observations. The first is the strong correlation between
these two phenomena. The lack of aspirations as a trait of the poor has been
documented across a wide range of countries and settings – among low-income urban
residents in America (MacLeod, 1995) and UK (LYSPE, 2006, in Cabinet Office, 2008),
Jamaican male youths (Walker, 1997) and rural Ethiopian households (Frankenberger
et al., 2007; Bernard et al., 2011). Second, this lack of aspirations among the poor does
not seem to be fully explained by external constraints such as a lack of opportunity or
information about pathways out of poverty. For example, Banerjee et al. (2011) report
on the take up of an asset assistance and training programme aimed at enhancing the
living standards of the ultra-poor in West Bengal, India. They find that 35.6% of the
households who are offered this programme did not take up the assistance – despite its
obvious benefits, as confirmed by changes in the well-being of programme partici-
pants.5 Similarly, Duflo et al. (2011) document very low rates of take up of highly
profitable fertiliser by maize farmers in Busia, Kenya – despite convenient opportu-
3 In her words, a lack of hope can cause a person ‘to rationally decide to hold back his or her efforts, avoid
investment, and thus achieve even less than he or she could otherwise have attained’ . . . Hope can fuel
aspirations . . . In turn, these aspirations can affect behaviour’. This is similar in spirit to the idea of
aspirations failure, formally modelled in this article.
4 As Albert Bandura puts it: ‘failure to address the psychosocial determinants of human behaviour is
often the weakest link in social policy initiatives. Simply providing ready access to resources does not mean
that people will take advantage of them.’ (Lecture to British Psychological Society (The Psychologist, 2009,
p. 505.)
5 Banerjee et al. (2011, p. 8) find no significant observable differences across participants and non-
participants who were offered the programme other than the fact that participants were younger and more
likely to be Hindu than Muslim. The religion difference in ‘refusal was anecdotally attributed to rumours . . ..
(and) a few households declined to participate on account of not having time or not wanting to care for
livestock’.
© 2014 The Authors.
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nities to buy it at reasonable prices.6 Farmers were also given ample opportunity both
to learn how to use the fertiliser and to realise that the rates of return from its use were
as high as 70% per annum – so the usual external constraints imposed by a lack of
money, information or opportunity do not seem to be at work. In the model below, we
therefore consider an alternative explanation for the persistence of poverty arising
from internal (behavioural) constraints exacerbated by poverty.
1.1. The Model
In this subsection, we develop a simple model that allows us to focus on the two-way
link between aspirations failure and poverty traps.
1.1.1. Preferences: aspirations as reference points
We consider an individual characterised by a given level of initial wealth
h0 2 H ¼ ½h; h  a bounded subset of ℜ+. He must choose costly effort e 2 [0, 1] that
will determine his final wealth h. The individual has an aspiration level (or goal)
g 2 ℜ+ with regard to his final wealth.
For any given initial wealth h0, the utility the individual derives from choosing an
effort level e depends not only on the cost of effort and the benefit of achieving a
particular level of final wealth h but also on his aspirations, as described by the utility
function below:
uðe; g ; hÞ ¼ bðhÞ þ v h g
h
 
 cðeÞ: (1)
The utility function of the individual has three additive components. The first
component is the benefit of reaching a specific level of final wealth. We make the
following assumption on b(h):
ASSUMPTION 1 (A1). b(h) is a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly
concave function over final wealth where b(0) = 0 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion
r(h) = hb 00(h)/b 0(h) < 1.
A1 is satisfied by a number of commonly used utility functions in the literature (e.g.
b(h) = ha, 0 < a < 1). The restriction on r(h) is required to derive the complementarity
between effort and initial wealth.
The second component, v[(h  g)/h], is a reference-dependent value function that
captures one of the key premises of the model: that is, an individual’s aspiration level g
is a reference point that affects the satisfaction experienced from achieving a level of
final wealth h. Specifically, we assume that it is the proportional gain or loss of final
wealth, relative to the reference point, that matters to the individual.
We make the following assumption on the shape value function v:
6 Duflo et al. (2011) interpret this evidence as being consistent with farmers who procrastinate on
purchase decisions, and are not sophisticated enough to recognise this bias. However, there are other
possible explanations for the same behaviour.
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ASSUMPTION 2 (A2). [v 0(x)  v 00(x)(1  x)] ≥ 0 for all feasible values of x and v is
continuously differentiable with v 0(0) > 0.
The assumption that [v 0(x)  v 00(x)(1  x)] ≥ 0 for all feasible values of x is
required to ensure that aspirations and effort are complements (Lemma 1). For
example, when x < 0 and v 0(x) > 0, heuristically, this assumption will be satisfied if v is
not ‘too’ convex over losses. Evidence from both laboratory and field studies (cited
below Proposition 2) suggests that there is considerable support for such comple-
mentarity between aspirations and effort. The assumption that v 0(0) > 0 has the
plausible implication that the decision-maker prefers to overachieve (rather than
underachieve) relative to his aspired level of wealth.
One possible formulation of v satisfying A2 is an S-shaped Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) value function with diminishing sensitivity, that is convex over losses and
concave over gains. Formally, v can be an increasing, continuously differentiable
function with v(0) = 0 being the inflexion point of the function so that v 0(0) > 0 but
v 00(0) = 0.7 Note that this formulation does not allow for loss aversion in a small
neighbourhood of zero as it would necessarily imply that v has a ‘kink’ (i.e. is non-
differentiable) at zero. Another possible formulation of v is a continuously
differentiable and strictly concave function that attains a maximum at a reference
point c (c, the bliss point of the value function, could be different from zero). In
Appendix B, we show two specific examples of such value functions.
Finally, the third component is the cost of effort c(e) about which we make the
following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 3 (A3). c(e) is a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and convex
function of effort with c(0) = 0.
1.2. How Poverty Imposes External Constraints
We assume that the poor face greater external (resource) constraints than the rich,
which effectively reduce their productivity. This could happen in myriad ways – for
instance, their lack of access to credit could render their efforts to acquire skills or run
a successful business less effective. Likewise, lack of access to information or influential
social networks could make it harder for them to find jobs than a rich person who puts
in the same effort. We capture such productivity effects of external constraints with the
following ‘reduced form’ assumption on the production function of final wealth:
ASSUMPTION 4 (A4). h = f (e, h0) = (1 + e)h0.
In other words, final wealth is proportional to initial wealth where the factor of
proportionality is determined by effort. The specific functional form of f (e,h0) is made
for ease of exposition. In Appendix C, we examine the robustness of our results to less
restrictive assumptions on the functional form of f .
7 Genicot and Ray (2014) use such an S-shaped value function for their analysis.
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1.3. Effort and Aspirations
1.3.1. Aspirations as consistent reference points
What determines individual aspirations? No doubt, there could be multiple influences.
Environmental factors such as a person’s family background, the norms of the
community in which he lives and the opportunities available, economic or otherwise
do matter – as do an individual’s own traits. In this article, our focus is on the latter. We
require an individual’s aspirations and effort to be mutually consistent (self-fulfilling)
at a solution to his decision-problem, even though he takes aspirations as given when
choosing effort.
The idea of requiring consistency between reference points and actions goes back to
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) reference-dependent theory of riskless choice, in
which preferences not only depend on consumption bundles but also on a reference
consumption bundle which ‘usually corresponds to the decision-maker’s current
position’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 1046).8 In light of this, we require that
aspirations are equal to (or consistent with) the (expected) level of final wealth given
effort, at the solution of the decision-problem.9 To put it in MacLeod’s (1995, p.15)
words, the ‘individual’s view of his or her own chances of getting ahead’ is consistent
with the effort level chosen. Formally, in our deterministic framework, we define an
effort–aspirations pair (e, g) as consistent whenever given individual effort e 2 [0, 1],
aspiration g is equal to the realised final wealth:
g ¼ f ðe; h0Þ ¼ ð1þ eÞh0 (2)
Our framework considers a world in which everyone can reach their aspirations. We
realise that such a framework is at odds with empirical evidence, because people often
do not. However, our aim is to model aspirations failures, rather than aspirations gaps
defined as the difference between achievement and aspirations.10 Reaching aspirations
does not necessarily imply aspiring optimally. This distinction is essential to
understand the essence of our study. Our goal is to be able to explain why people
may aspire lower than their potential, despite being able to reach it. In Appendix C, we
discuss how our our model can be extended to allow not only for an aspirations failure
but also for an aspirations gap.
1.4. Choosing between Consistent Effort (and Aspirations) Pairs: A Normative Benchmark
So far, we have laid out two key premises:
(i) aspirations are reference points that affect our utility from achieving a
particular level of final wealth; but
8 This idea is also in line with ethnographer MacLeod’s (1995, p. 15) take on aspirations: ‘aspirations
reflect an individual’s view of his or her own chances for getting ahead’.
9 It is important to note that expectations and aspirations are two distinctive concepts. In our deterministic
model, aspirations enter the pay-offs via a reference point. Expectations, however, enter typically via the
weights (beliefs) attached to the pay-offs associated with (uncertain) future outcomes.
10 In an interactive model where aspirations are at least in part socially determined, such a gap would be an
endemic feature (Bogliacino and Ortoleva, 2013; Genicot and Ray, 2014).
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(ii) at a solution to the individual’s decision-problem, aspirations are required to
be consistent with effort choice.
When an individual is choosing among consistent effort–aspirations pairs
(e, f (e,h0)), by construction, his view of his chances of getting ahead is consistent
with the effort level he chooses. In this sense, he fully internalises the feedback
between effort and aspirations. Hence, maximising pay-offs is formally equivalent to
maximising the resulting induced preferences over effort. We label such a decision-
maker as a rational decision-maker and the solution of such a rational decision-
problem, a rational solution. We certainly do not claim that most individuals are
rational decision-makers who fully internalise the feedback between effort and
aspirations. Rather, this only provides a normative benchmark against which we
contrast the behavioural model of decision-making studied below.11
Formally, a rational solution is defined below:
DEFINITION 1. A rational solution is a pair ðe^; g^ Þ such that
e^ 2 arg max
e2½0;1
sðe; h0Þ ¼ uðe; f ðe; h0Þ; f ðe; h0ÞÞ (3)
and
g^ ¼ f ðe^; h0Þ: (4)
At a rational solution, by construction, x = [f (e, h0)  f (e, h0)]/f (e, h0) = 0 so that
sðe; h0Þ ¼ bðf ðe; h0ÞÞ þ vð0Þ  cðeÞ:
Note that from a normative perspective, the value function v is irrelevant in ranking
effort as it enters the (induced) preferences over effort of a rational decision-maker as
an additive constant. Moreover, under Assumptions A1, A3 and A4, a rational solution
is the unique outcome of a well-defined strictly concave maximisation problem.
The following proposition characterises the set S(h0) of rational solutions and states
the conditions under which effort and initial status (or wealth) are complements.
PROPOSITION 1. Under Assumptions A1, A3 and A4, for a fixed value of h0, there exists a
unique rational solution level of effort and aspirations ðe^; g^ Þ which is non-decreasing in h0
(strictly increasing in h0 when the solution is interior).
Proposition 1 tells us that a poor rational decision-maker will choose lower effort and
aspire to a lower level of final wealth than a richer rational decision-maker. This result
is driven by two opposite effects. On the one hand, as the benefit function b(f (e, h0))
from final wealth is concave, the utility of an additional unit of effort is higher, the
poorer a person is. On the other hand, the complementarity between effort and initial
wealth implies that an additional unit of effort is less effective in producing wealth for a
poor person than for a rich person. The assumption that r(h) < 1 (by A1) implies that
11 The justification for such normative benchmark is provided in Dalton and Ghosal (2013).
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the first effect does not dominate the second effect, thus ensuring that ðe^; g^ Þ is non-
decreasing in h0. Of course, given the lower initial wealth h0, the modest aspiration and
effort choice of a poorer person cannot be regarded as an aspiration failure.
1.5. Effort and Aspirations Choice of a Behavioural Decision Maker
Admittedly, most people do not fully internalise how their aspirations are shaped by
their effort choices; henceforth, we refer to such decision-makers as behavioural
decision-makers. Our third central premise then is that, while choosing effort e, a
behavioural decision-maker takes an aspired level of wealth g as fixed.
There is considerable evidence of this kind of behaviour in various kinds of life
situations. Easterlin (2001), for example provides evidence that people do not
anticipate how their aspirations adapt upwards, as their income rises. In a similar vein,
Knight and Gunatilaka (2008) present field evidence of rural migrants settled in urban
areas who do not foresee how their aspirations will adapt to their new situation and
they end up less happy than non-migrants in both locations.12
Formally, a behavioural decision-maker chooses e, while taking g as given, to solve
Maxe2½0;1 ~uðe; g ; h0Þ ¼ uðe; g ; f ðe; h0ÞÞ (5)
let e(g, h0) denote the set of payoff maximising efforts. Then,
DEFINITION 2. A behavioural solution is a consistent effort-Aspiration pair (e*, g*) such that
(i) e* 2 e(g*, h0) and (ii) g* = f (e*, h0).13
Even though a behavioural decision-maker takes his aspiration level g as fixed, we
require that the effort–aspiration pair that solves his decision-problem is mutually
consistent (as definition 2 suggests). The following Lemma shows that under the
assumptions made on the curvature of the value function (A2) and the production
function for final wealth (A4), effort and aspirations are complements.
LEMMA 1. For a fixed level of initial wealth h0, under Assumptions A2 and A4,
@2 ~uðe; g ; h0Þ=@e@g  0 that is effort and aspirations are complements.
We are now in a position to state the following result characterising the set
Bðh0Þ  <2þ of behavioural solutions for a given value of h0.
PROPOSITION 2. For a fixed level of initial wealth h0, under Assumptions A2 and A4: (i)
there exists a minimal and a maximal effort level, eðg ; h0Þ and eðg ; h0Þ, both of which are
12 Our framework can be extended to scenarios where the decision-maker partially internalises the
feedback from effort to aspirations with some probability k. In such a scenario, the decision-maker in a
behavioural decision-problem chooses effort to maximise ~uðe; g Þ ¼ kuðe; g Þ þ ð1  kÞvðeÞ. This is formally
equivalent to Loewenstein et al.’s (2003) model of projection bias.
13 The effort–aspiration pair at a behavioural solution is self-fulfilling. K€oszegi (2010) defines a notion of a
personal equilibrium which is conceptually equivalent to the notion of a behavioural solution. A behavioural
solution is also equivalent to a psychological Nash equilibrium (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) or a Nash
equilibrium in Loss Aversion Games (Shalev, 2000) in a one-person deterministic decision-problem
framework.
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non-decreasing in g, and (ii) there exists a minimal and a maximal effort–aspiration pair in B
(h0), ðe; g Þ and ðe; g Þ.
Proposition 2 shows that, at a behavioural solution, effort and aspirations are
complements, that is higher aspirations are motivators of greater effort.14 This result
is in line with evidence from psychology and economics. For instance, Heath et al.
(1999) find that individuals exposed to high goals exert higher effort and persist
more in different physical and cognitive tasks than individuals who are exposed to low
goals. Abeler et al. (2011) find similar results in the laboratory: when participants
have higher reference points for earnings, they persevere longer at the experimental
task. There is also evidence that aspirations also act as reference points for life
goals. In a field experiment with female entrepreneurs in India, Field et al. (2009)
show that higher aspirations motivate positive changes in women’s financial
behaviour.
In the next subsection, we use the two solution concepts proposed here (behavioural
and rational) to define aspiration failures. We note that they are formally identical to
the steady state(s) of adaptive preference mechanisms such as those studied by von
Weizsacker (1971), Hammond (1976) and Pollak (1978).15
1.6. Internal Constraints and Aspirations Failure
To explore this link systematically, we begin by shedding more light on the nature of
behavioural solutions. Although the effort–aspirations pair is required to be consistent
at such a solution, a behavioural decision-maker takes his aspirations as given, when
choosing effort. If the exogenously taken aspirations level does not happen to coincide
with the level of aspirations at a rational solution, the individual will be imposing an
externality on himself that he does not internalise. This creates the possibility that a
behavioural solution is welfare dominated by another consistent effort–aspirations
pair. At such a behavioural solution, we say that the (behavioural) decision-maker is
internally constrained. Formally:
DEFINITION 3. For a fixed level of initial wealth h0, an individual is internally constrained
at a behavioural solution (e*, g*) if (e*, g*) 62 S(h0).
14 Note that Assumptions A2 and A4 which guarantee this result are assumptions on the fundamentals of
the model (preferences and technology).
15 To elaborate on the adaptive preference mechanism interpretation, suppose there is an initial
exogenous and fixed aspirations level g0. At any step t in the ‘tatonnement-like’ preference adjustment
process, preferences over effort are represented by a utility function ~uðe; gt1; h0Þ which depends on the
aspirations level at the preceding step. At each step, the decision-maker chooses effort et 2 e(gt1, h0) while
aspirations are determined by gt = f (et, h0). The decision-maker continues adjusting the effort he is willing to
undertake until a steady state outcome is reached, that is e 2 e(g, h0) and g = f (e, h0), corresponding to the
outcome of a behavioural solution. Under Assumptions A1–A4, standard results on the stability of Nash
equilibria imply that the preference adjustment mechanism (and hence, the adjustment of effort) converges
to a long-run outcome (Vives, 1990). In contrast, at a rational solution, the adjustment to a steady-state
outcome takes at most one step. This is because, at the initial (and each subsequent) step, the decision-maker
anticipates that the aspiration level at step t + 1 is affected by the effort chosen at step t (i.e.
et 2 arg maxe 2 [0,1]s(e, h0) and gt = f (et, h0)).
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The question that arises now is under what conditions the behavioural individ-
ual is internally constrained. The following proposition shows that under the ass-
umptions made so far, an interior rational solution can never be a behavioural
solution.
PROPOSITION 3. For a fixed level of initial wealth h0, under Assumptions A1, A2, A3 and
A4, an interior rational solution ðe^; g^ Þ (where e^ 2 ð0; 1Þ) is never a behavioural solution.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that for an interior rational solution to be a
behavioural solution it is necessary that v 0(0) = 0. However, this possibility is ruled out
by A2 (v 0(0) > 0).
This brings us to corner solutions – what happens if we allow for them? In what
follows, we describe the conditions under which both the rational and the
behavioural solution are corner solutions. Given these stronger restrictions on v and
c (relative to those imposed by Assumptions A1–A4), we show that multiple
behavioural solutions exist and that the minimal behavioural solution is welfare
dominated.
PROPOSITION 4. For a fixed level of initial wealth h0, there exist constants K2 > K1 > 0 such
that whenever K1 ≤ c 0(0), c 0(1) ≤ K2, v 0(0) < K2  K1 and 2v 0(x)  v 00(x)(1  x) ≥ 0
for all feasible values of x, both the unique rational solution and each behavioural solution is a
corner solution and the minimal effort–aspirations pair is welfare dominated.
The proof of the above proposition shows that the unique rational solution
is a corner solution where e = 1; consequently aspirations are at the highest
possible level g = 2h0. There are two behavioural solutions: one (minimal solution)
where e = 0 with the lowest possible aspirations g = h0 and another (maximal
solution) with e = 1 and g = 2h0. At the minimal behavioural solution, the final
wealth of the decision-maker is equal to his initial wealth and the individual is
internally constrained. We refer to such a behavioural solution as an aspiration
failure.
2. Behavioural Poverty Traps
In this Section, we examine how poverty can exacerbate aspiration failure, hence
making it an additional cause of poverty persistence. Given the multiple behavioural
solutions described above, we show that lower initial wealth raises the probability that
he ends up at the welfare-dominated minimal effort–aspiration pair.
Consider a discrete effort version of our framework with two effort levels e 2 {0,1} and
c ¼ cð1Þ[ 0 if e ¼ 1
cð0Þ ¼ 0 if e ¼ 0
 
:
Recall that by A4, when e = 1, h = 2h0 and when e = 0, h = h0. Hence, the net benefit
from exerting effort at a rational solution is h(h0) = b(2h0)  b(h0)  c.
Let us spell out how h(h0) relates to h0 and also the implications for v in our model.
We use these results throughout the rest of this Section.
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LEMMA 2. (i) Under A1, h(h0) the net benefit of exerting effort at a rational solution is
strictly increasing in initial wealth h0. (ii) Under A2, v(1/2) ≥ v(1).
Part (i ) of Lemma 2 is self-explanatory. In Lemma 2(ii ), note that, given the
production function f (e, h0) = (1 + e)h0, v(1) denotes the aspirations-outcome gap
when e = 0 and aspirations are set at their highest value 2h0; similarly, v(1/2) denotes
the value aspirations-outcome gap when e = 1 and aspirations are set at their lowest
value h0. Thus, given two possible effort levels and outcomes, Lemma 2 (ii ) says that
the value of overachieving at the low target by exerting high effort (i.e. v(1/2)) is less
than the value of underachieving at the high target by exerting low effort (i.e. v(1)).
The following result characterises the rational solution and the behavioural solutions
as a function of h0:
LEMMA 3. Under A1, A2 and A4:
(i) There exists h^ s.t. (a) if h0  h^, at a rational solution, e^ðh0Þ ¼ 0, g^ ðh0Þ ¼ h0, and
(b) if h0  h^, at a rational solution e^ðh0Þ ¼ 1, g^ ðh0Þ ¼ 2h0.
(ii) There exists hH ≥ hL s.t. for (a) h0 ≤ hL : the unique behavioural outcome is
e*(h0) = 0, g
*(h0) = h0; (b) hL ≤ h0 ≤ hH : there are multiple behavioural outcomes
e*(h0) = 0, g
*(h0) = h0 and e
*(h0) = 1, g
*(h0) = 2h0 and (c) h0 ≥ hH : the unique
behavioural outcome is e*(h0) = 1, g
*(h0) = 2h0.
(iii) Further, hL  h^ if and only if v(1) ≤ 0; and hH  h^ if and only if v(1/2) ≤ 0.
First, note that Lemma 3 implies that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to apply in this
discrete version of the model. That is, effort and aspirations are non-decreasing in
initial wealth at a rational solution.
Second, recall that Proposition 4 already shows the possibility of multiple
behavioural solutions in the continuous effort version of the model. This ensures
that multiplicity does not necessarily arise only when effort is discrete.
Finally, Lemma 3 shows that two types of poverty traps can emerge from our model:
a standard and a behavioural poverty trap. Whenever h0\ h^, the individual is caught
in a standard poverty trap driven solely by material deprivation: there are wealth levels
so low that the incremental wealth benefit from greater effort is dominated by the cost
of such high effort.
Let us now study in more detail, how a behavioural poverty trap may emerge. For
this, we need to examine how a behavioural outcome pair of effort and aspiration level
is selected. Consider an initial aspiration level g0 of an individual, that is drawn from
some underlying probability distribution common to the rich and the poor. g0 is
irrelevant for a rational decision-maker, because he internalises the feedback from
efforts to aspirations. Therefore, he will always only pick the unique rational solution as
his effort–aspirations choice, no matter what his g0 is. In contrast, a behavioural
decision-maker’s effort choice will be affected by g0, as he takes his aspiration level as
given.
The selection mechanism involves two stages:
(i) first for a given randomly generated initial aspirations level g0, the individual
chooses an effort level e; and
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(ii) second for a given e, the aspirations level (i.e. anticipated outcome) adjusts via
the function g = f (e, h0) = (1 + e)h0.
16
Given the above selection mechanism, the following proposition addresses how
poverty and initial disadvantage interact to generate a behavioural poverty trap
characterised by low effort and aspirations failure.
PROPOSITION 5. Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A4, the lower the initial wealth h0 of an
individual, the more likely he is to experience a behavioural poverty trap, that is end up at the
minimal effort–aspirations pair.
Proposition 5 provides an explanation for the empirical observation of poor people
holding low aspirations (as suggested by the evidence cited in Section 2) and not
realising their full potential. To understand the intuition underlying Proposition 5,
consider two behavioural decision-makers who have the same initial aspirations level,
one rich and the other poor. At this given aspiration level, the poor person would
optimally choose a lower effort level than the rich one, because his lower wealth reduces
his marginal benefit from effort. However, the feedback from effort to aspirations
implies that the lower effort of the poor person will cause his aspiration level to diverge
from that of the rich person. In equilibrium, the poor person has two reasons to put in
low effort: not only are his net benefits lower, his aspiration level, which determines the
marginal benefit of effort in equilibrium, is lower as well. In this sense, poverty curtails a
poor person’s capacity to aspire, in the spirit of Appadurai (2004).
Thus, the gist of our analysis so far is that, far from being an innate trait of poor
people, low aspirations emerge as an equilibrium outcome as a consequence of their
initial disadvantage. It is not that a poor person fails to achieve the outcome he aspires
to; rather, he simply does not aspire as high as the best outcome he could have
realised.
2.1. Welfare Implications
It remains to examine the welfare implications of the two types of poverty traps we
study here. We proceed as follows. We fix h0 and compare the pay-off of an agent
caught in a behavioural poverty trap with the pay-off that the same agent would obtain
at a rational solution:
PROPOSITION 6. For a fixed level of initial wealth h0, under Assumptions A1, A2 and A4,
whenever v(1) ≤ 0 and v(1/2) < 0, a behavioural poverty trap is welfare dominated. When v
(1/2) > 0, there is no level of initial wealth h0 for which a behavioural poverty trap is welfare
dominated.
Recall from our discussion following Lemma 2 that v(1/2) is the maximum extent to
which a person can overachieve relative to the outcome he aspires to, given the
16 Note that stage (ii ) above is formally identical to the adaptive preference mechanism described in
footnote 15 in the special case of two effort levels.
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production function f (e, h0) = (1 + e)h0. Thus, the condition v(1/2) < 0, combined
with the the Assumption A2 that v 0(0) > 0 implies that an individual obtains positive
utility from overachieving relative to his aspiration level, except at the maximum level
of overachievement. This condition is consistent with A2 (that the value function is
upward sloping at a behavioural equilibrium i.e. v 0(0) > 0 and [v 0(x)  v 00(x)
(1  x)] ≥ 0 for all feasible values of x).17 When the v(1/2) < 0, the level of initial
wealth at which the switch to a high effort–aspirations pair occurs at a rational solution
(h^) is lower than the level of initial wealth at which such a pair is the unique
behavioural decision outcome (hH). Therefore, for each level of initial wealth between
two threshold values h^ and hH:
(i) the behavioural solution is welfare dominated by the corresponding rational
solution; and
(ii) low aspirations become a source of disadvantage in their own right.
The two-way feedback between aspirations and effort implies that, in this wealth
interval, any intervention that sufficiently raises aspirations alone will move the
individual out of the behavioural poverty trap.18
However when v(1/2) > 0, an individual’s utility from overachieving is positive
even at the highest possible level of aspiration. In other words, higher effort is
always welfare-enhancing. As a result, there is no level of initial wealth for which a
behavioural poverty trap is welfare dominated by a rational solution. Further,
raising aspirations for any level of initial wealth between hL and hH will increase
effort at a behavioural decision outcome but such an outcome will be welfare
dominated by the rational solution. In such scenarios, raising aspirations must also
be accompanied by a transfer mechanism that raises the initial wealth of the
individual.
Finally, when initial wealth is below h^, the only way to ensure that an individual
breaks out of the poverty trap is to raise the initial wealth of such an individual.
2.2. Policy Implications
A key feature of our model is that it allows us to study, within a single framework,
the justification for and the effectiveness of multiple kinds of policy interventions –
those that aim to relax external constraints but also those that work on relaxing
internal constraints. The kinds of poverty traps described in the previous subsection
imply that anti-poverty initiatives aiming to tackle persistent poverty need to be
mindful of two important issues. The first is that, under acute poverty, the
effectiveness of policies targeted to relax external constraints will be maximised
if they also reduce internal constraints (e.g. by changing aspirations). The second
17 In Appendix B, we work a number of different examples of such value functions that satisfy these
conditions.
18 Bernard et al. (2014) report experimental evidence from rural Ethiopia consistent with our theoretical
prediction. Individuals were randomly invited to watch documentaries about people from similar
communities who had succeeded in agriculture or small business. Six months after the screening of the
documentaries, they found that only those whose initial assets and/or initial aspirations were above the
median in the baseline, increased their aspirations and assets.
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is that there exist conditions where relaxing internal constraints alone (with-
out altering external ones) can alter behaviour and reduce the persistence of
poverty.
A good example of the latter type of policy intervention designed to raise
aspirations of low-income children is the Fesnojiv classical music orchestra
programme developed in Venezuela 30 years ago by Jose Antonio Abreu. The
programme project provides free classical musical training and the opportunity to
perform in orchestras, to these children. In the founder’s words, ‘Participating in the
orchestral movement has made it possible for them [the children] to set up new
goals, plans, projects and dreams, and at the same time, it is a way of creating
meaning and helping them in their day-to-day struggle for better conditions of life’.19
About 96% of the young musicians have good to excellent school records – even
though education was not the focus of the programme. In terms of our framework in
this study, the programme manages to raise g0, the initial aspiration level of the
children. The UK programme ‘Supporting parents on kids education (SPOKE)’
which works with groups of parents to set personal goals for their children is another
example of this kind of intervention. In a different setting, Beaman et al. (2012) find
that in India, that exposure to female leaders in local government (as part of a
mandated reservation of posts for women) raises both the aspirations and
educational attainment of girls significantly – despite no change in the resources
available for their education. In terms of our framework, such exposure reduces the
behavioural bias of those exposed to female leaders, by helping them see the link
between their current effort and future aspirations.
3. Conclusion
Appadurai (2004) has argued that the lack of a capacity to aspire is an important
reason for the persistence of poverty. We have developed a novel and simple
framework to study the psychology of poverty and aspirations failure. We show that the
failure to aspire may be a consequence of poverty, rather than its cause. In our model,
this outcome arises through an interaction between two factors:
(i) all individuals, rich or poor, fail to appreciate how their effort choices shape
their aspirations over time – but the poor pay a bigger price for this failure;
because
(ii) the complementarity between initial wealth and effort further lowers their
incentive to put in effort.
Their lower effort choices give rise to lower aspirations through the two-way feedback
between effort and aspirations. The key policy implication of our study is that policies
that address aspiration levels can, at the very minimum, enhance the effectiveness of
policies that address material deprivation; moreover, there are situations in which such
policies on their own, can enhance welfare, without any change in material
circumstances.
19 See http://www.rightlivelihood.org/recip/abreu.htm.
© 2014 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2016] P O V E R T Y A N D A S P I R A T I O N S F A I L U R E 179
In this study, we have consciously chosen a deterministic static model of individual
decision-making because it was the simplest model that could generate behavioural
poverty traps. We view this as a first step of a bigger project, where future extensions
would include models with explicit dynamics, learning and individual interactions.
Also, while uncertainty in final wealth was not required in the present model, there are
scenarios where it would be central to understanding poverty traps, especially to model
pessimistic beliefs or an external locus of control. Incorporating these elements into
the study of poverty and aspirations promises interesting avenues for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. A1 and A3 imply that s(e, h0) is continuous and strictly concave in e for
each h0. As e 2 [0, 1] is a compact set, a unique solution to an rational decision-problem (RDP)
exists.
We now characterise the conditions under which, at an RDP, effort and initial wealth are
complements. Recall the utility at an RDP is:
sðe; h0Þ ¼ bðf ðe; h0ÞÞ þ vð0Þ  cðeÞ: (A.1)
Given initial wealth h0, the marginal utility of effort at an RDP is:
@s
@e
¼ b0ðhÞ @f
@e
 c 0ðeÞ; (A.2)
and the marginal utility of effort as initial wealth h0 increases is:
@2s
@e@h0
¼ b0ðhÞ @
2f
@e@h0
þ b00ðhÞ @f
@e
@f
@h0
: (A.3)
Given initial wealth h0, effort and initial wealth are complements as long as:
@2s
@e@h0
 0, b0ðhÞ @
2f
@e@h0
þ b00ðhÞ @f
@e
@f
@h0
 0: (A.4)
By A4, f (e, h0) = (1 + e)h0. Then @f/@e = h0,@
2f/@e@h0 = 1 and @f/@h0 = 1 + e. By substitution:
@2s
@e@h0
¼ b0ðhÞ þ b00ðhÞh0ð1þ eÞ 0, b0ðhÞ  b00ðhÞh0ð1þ eÞ , 1ð1þ eÞ  
b00ðhÞh0
b0ðhÞ :
Note that A4 implies h/(1 + e) = h0. Substituting this in the equation above:
@2s
@e@h0
 0, 1  b
00ðhÞh
b0ðhÞ ¼ rðhÞ;
with @2s/@e@h0 > 0 provided we are at an interior solution to an RDP and r(h) < 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall, the utility at a behavioural decision-problem (BDP) is:
~uðe; g ; h0Þ ¼ bðf ðe; h0ÞÞ þ v f ðe; h0Þ  g
f ðe; h0Þ
 
 cðeÞ: (A.5)
Given initial wealth h0 and an aspiration level g, the marginal net utility of effort is:
@ ~u
@e
¼ b0ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ @f
@e
þ v0ðxÞ @f
@e
g
ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ2
 c 0ðeÞ; (A.6)
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where x = [f (e, h0)  g]/f (e, h0). The marginal net utility of effort as the aspiration level g
increases is:
@2 ~u
@e@g
¼ @f
@e
v00ðxÞ 1
f ðe; h0Þ
g
ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ2
þ v0ðxÞ 1ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ2
" #
¼ @f
@e
1
ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ2
v0ðxÞ  v00ðxÞ g
f ðe; h0Þ
 
:
(A.7)
Note that as x = [f (e, h0)  g]/f (e,h0)$ (1  x) = g/f (e,h0). Hence,
@2 ~u
@e@g
¼ @f
@e
1
ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ2
v0ðxÞ  v00ðxÞð1 xÞ½ : (A.8)
By A4, @f/@e > 0. Hence, for a given value of initial wealth h0, whenever [v 0(x)  v 00(x)
(1  x)] ≥ 0 (A2), effort and aspirations are complements.
Proof of Proposition 2. Define a map Ψ : [0, 1] × [h0, 2h0]?[0, 1] × [h0, 2h0], Ψ(e,g; h0) =
(e(g,h0), f (e,h0)). Since f (e, h0) is (strictly) increasing in e (A4) and @2 ~u=@e@g  0 (Lemma 1
which relies on A2 and A4), it follows that e(g, h0) is a compact (and hence complete)
sublattice of [0, 1] and has a maximal and minimal element (in the usual component wise
vector ordering) denoted by eðg ; h0Þ and eðg ; h0Þ respectively both of which are increasing in
g. Therefore, the map ðeðg ; h0Þ; f ðe; h0ÞÞ is a continuous, non-decreasing function from
[0, 1] × [h0, 2h0] to itself and as [0, 1] × [h0, 2h0] is a compact (and hence, complete)
lattice, by Tarski’s fix-point theorem ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ðeðg ; h0Þ; f ðe; h0ÞÞ is a fix-point of Ψ.
By a symmetric argument, ðeðg ; h0Þ; f ðe; h0ÞÞ is a continuous, non-decreasing function from
[0,1] × [h0,2h0] to itself and ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ðeðg ; h0Þ; f ðe; h0ÞÞ is also a fixed-point of Ψ;
moreover, ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ and ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ are respectively the largest and smallest
fix-points of Ψ.
Proof of Proposition 3. As already noted in the proof of Proposition 1, under A1 and A3, s(e, h0)
is strictly concave in e. Therefore, at an interior rational solution ðe^; g^ Þ, (A.2), the marginal utility
of effort must be zero, that is
@s
@e
¼ b0ðf ðe^; h0ÞÞ @f
@e
ðe^; h0Þ  c 0ðe^Þ ¼ 0: (A.9)
Likewise, from (A.6), we know that the marginal utility of effort at behavioural equilibrium
(e*, g*) is:
@ ~u
@e
¼ b0ðf ðe; h0ÞÞ @f
@e
ðe; h0Þ þ v0ð0Þ
@f
@e
ðe; h0Þ
f ðe; h0Þ  c
0ðeÞ: (A.10)
Hence, an interior rational solution is a behavioural solution if and only if
v0ð0Þ
@f
@e
ðe; h0Þ
f ðe; h0Þ ¼ 0:
However, note that by A4, @f /@e > 0 and f (e*, h0) 2 (h0, 2h0) so for h0 > 0, f (e*, h0) > 0.
So an interior rational solution is a behavioural solution if and only if v 0(0) = 0. However,
since v 0(0) > 0 (by A2), an interior rational solution cannot be a behavioural solution
as well.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof proceeds by construction of a robust example with stronger
restrictions than those imposed by Assumptions A1–A4. In this example, the rational solution is
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in a corner. There are two behavioural solutions, one in the same corner as the rational
solution, and the other behavioural solution has a lower level of effort (we take this low effort
to be equal to zero).
By computation, note that
@2 ~u
@e2
¼ b00ðð1þ eÞh0Þh0  gð1þ eÞ3 2v
0ðxÞ  v00ðxÞð1 xÞ½   c 0ðeÞ; (A.11)
where x = [(1 + e)h0  g]/(1 + e)h0 and if we assume that 2v 0(x)  v 0 0(x)(1  x) ≥ 0 for all
feasible values of x in addition to A1 and A3, @2~u=@e2\ 0 i.e. ~uðe; g ; h0Þ is strictly concave in e. It
follows that if (0, h0) is a behavioural solution, then
b0ðh0Þh0 þ v0ð0Þ c 0ð0Þ;
and if (1, 2h0) is a behavioural solution, then
b0ð2h0Þh0 þ v
0ð0Þ
2
 c 0ð1Þ , b0ð2h0Þ2h0 þ v0ð0Þ 2c 0ð1Þ:
By A1, as r(h) < 1, hb 0(h) is an increasing function of h; it follows that
2h0b
0ð2h0Þ  h0b0ðh0Þ[ 0, 2h0b0ð2h0Þ þ vð0Þ[ h0b0ðh0Þ þ v0ð0Þ:
Let K1 = h0b 0(h0) + v 0(0) and K2 = 2h0b 0(2h0) + v 0(0): it follows that 0 < K1 < K2 (under A1) so
that whenever
K1 þ v0ð0Þ c 0ð0Þ\c 0ð1ÞK2 þ v0ð0Þ;
ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ð0; h0Þ and ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ð1; 2h0Þ.
Note that ðe^ðh0Þ; g^ ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ð1; 2h0Þ is the unique rational solution, if and only if
b0ð2h0Þh0 c 0ð1Þ , K2 2c 0ð1Þ;
which implies that
0\v0ð0Þ\b0ð2h0Þ2h0  h0b0ðh0Þ ¼ K2  K1:
Moreover, as the unique rational solution is ðe^ðh0Þ; g^ ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ð1; 2h0Þ, it follows that
ðeðh0Þ; g ðh0ÞÞ ¼ ð0; h0Þ is welfare dominated.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) As h(h0) = b(2h0)  b(h0)  c, by computation, h 0(h0) = 2b 0(2h0)  b 0(h0). Thus, for
h0 > 0
h0ðh0Þ[ 0, h0h0ðh0Þ[ 0:
By A1, as r(h) < 1, h0b 0(h0) is an increasing function of h0. It follows that
h0h
0ðh0Þ ¼ 2h0b0ð2h0Þ  h0b0ðh0Þ [ 0;
so that h 0(h0) > 0 as required.
(ii) From Lemma 1 (under A2) we know that effort and aspirations are complements:
@2~u=@e@g [ 0. This is equivalent to the property that ~uðe; g ; h0Þ satisfies increasing
differences in e,g: that is for (e 0, g 0) ≥ (e, g),
~uðe 0; g 0; h0Þ  ~uðe; g 0; h0Þ ~uðe 0; g ; h0Þ  ~uðe; g ; h0Þ:
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As ~uðe; g ; h0Þ satisfies the property of increasing differences in e, g, by computation, it follows
that for (e 0, g 0) ≥ (e, g),
v
f ðe 0; h0Þ  g 0
f ðe 0; h0Þ
 
 v f ðe; h0Þ  g
0
f ðe; h0Þ
 
 v f ðe
0; h0Þ  g
f ðe 0; h0Þ
 
 v f ðe; h0Þ  g
f ðe; h0Þ
 
:
(A.12)
Let e 0 = 1, g 0 = f (1, h0) = 2h0, e = 0 and g = f (0, h0) = h0 (by A4). Then, by substitution, (A.12)
reduces to:
vð1Þ v 1
2
 
, vð1Þ  v 1
2
 
(A.13)
as required.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) Consider, first, the effort and aspiration pair consistent with a rational
solution as initial status changes. For a given value of h, e = 1, g = 2h0 (by A4) is a rational
solution iff
bð2h0Þ  c bðh0Þ , hðh0Þ 0:
Therefore, whenever r(h) < 1 for all h > 0 (by A1), h 0(h0) ≥ 0. Further,
lim
h0!0
hðh0Þ\0;
so that there exists h^ (the implicit solution to h(h0) = 0 or h^ ¼ h01ð0Þ) such that:
(a) if h0\ h^, at a rational solution e^ðh0Þ ¼ 0, g^ ðh0Þ ¼ h0; and
(b) if h0  h^, at a rational solution e^ðh0Þ ¼ 1, g^ ðh0Þ ¼ 2h0.
(ii) Consider, next, the effort and aspiration pair consistent with a behavioural solution as
initial wealth changes. For a given value of h0:
(a) e = 1, g = 2h0 is a behavioural solution iff
bð2h0Þ  c bðh0Þ þ v h0  2h0h0
 
, hðh0Þ vð1Þ; and
(b) e = 0, g = h0 is a behavioural solution iff
bðh0Þ bð2h0Þ þ v 2h0  h0
2h0
 
 c , hðnh0Þ  v 1
2
 
:
By Lemma 2, (A.13) (which relies on A1, A2 and A4), v(1/2) ≥ v(1) . Let hL be the
implicit solution to h(h0) = v(1) (i.e. hL = h01(v(1))) and hH be the implicit solution to h
(h0) = v(1/2) (i.e. hH = h01(v(1/2))). Then, clearly, hH ≥ hL. It follows that there are three
possible configurations compatible with a behavioural solution:
(a) when h0 ≤ hL, the unique behavioural outcome is e*(h0)=0, g*(h0) = h0;
(b) when hL ≤ h0 ≤ hH, there are multiple behavioural outcomes e*(h0) = 0, g*(h0) = h0
and e*(h0) = 1, g
*(h0) = 2h0; and
(c) when h0 ≥ hH, the unique behavioural outcome is e*(h0) = 1, g*(h0) = 2h0.
(iii) Note that h(.) is an increasing function. As h^ is the implicit solution to h(h0) = 0 and hL
is the implicit solution to h(h0) = v(1), it follows that hL  h^ if and only if v(1) ≤ 0. Further,
as hH is the implicit solution to h(h0) = v(1/2), it follows that hH  h^ if and only if
v(1/2) ≥ 0 ⇔ v(1/2) ≤ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 5. As a first step, fix h0. Let ~g ðh0Þ solve the equation
~uð1; g ; h0Þ ¼ ~uð0; g ; h0Þ
bð2h0Þ þ v 2h0  g
2h0
 
 c ¼ bðh0Þ þ v h0  gh0
 
bð2h0Þ  bðh0Þ  c ¼ v h0  gh0
 
 v 2h0  g
2h0
 
hðh0Þ ¼ v h0  gh0
 
 v 2h0  g
2h0
 
:
By Lemma 3 (which relies on A1, A2 and A4), (i) h(h0) is increasing in h0, while (ii) v(h0g/h0)
v(2h0g/2h0) is decreasing in g. Let ~g ðh0Þ denote the implicit solution to the preceding
equation. Then, clearly ~g ðh0Þ is decreasing in h0.
Further, for hL < h0 < hH:
(i) ~g ðh0Þ [ h0: ~g ðh0Þ  h0 implies that the optimal effort for the behavioural individual is
e = 0; and
(ii) ~g ðh0Þ\ 2h0: ~g ðh0Þ  2h0 implies that the optimal effort for the behavioural individual
is e = 1.
Moreover, h0 ≤ hL implies ~g ðh0Þ ¼ h0 and h0 ≥ hH implies ~g ðh0Þ ¼ 2h0.
It follows that:
(a) if g\ ~g ðh0Þ, the optimal effort for a behavioural individual is e = 0; and
(b) if g  ~g ðh0Þ, the optimal effort for a behavioural individual is e = 1.
Therefore, ½0; ~g ðh0ÞÞ is the basin of attraction of the behavioural decision outcome:
ðeðh0Þ ¼ 0; g ðh0Þ ¼ h0Þ;
while ½~g ðh0Þ; 2h0 is the basin of attraction of the behavioural decision outcome:
ðeðh0Þ ¼ 1; g ðh0Þ ¼ 2h0Þ:
Let m denote the pdf (and M the corresponding cdf) for g0. The probability with which the
behavioural outcome is (e*(h0) = 0, g
*(h0) = h0) is equal to the probability that g0 2 ½h0; ~g ðh0ÞÞ
which is M ð~g ðh0ÞÞ. Likewise, the probability with which the behavioural outcome is
(e*(h0) = 1, g
*(h0) = 2h0) is equal to the probability that g0 2 ½~g ðh0Þ; 2h0 which is
1  M ð~g ðh0ÞÞ. As ~g ðh0Þ is decreasing in h0, the probability that the individual is caught in a
behavioural poverty trap, M ð~g ðh0ÞÞ, is decreasing in h0.
Proof of Proposition 6. We check that for a fixed level of initial wealth h0, an individual stuck in
a behavioural poverty trap is welfare dominated by another individual stuck in standard poverty
trap. Note that h^ ¼ h01ð0Þ h01 v 1=2ð Þð Þ ¼ hH by Lemma 3 (which relies on A1, A2 and A4)
if and only if v(1/2) > 0 ⇔ v(1/2) < 0. Further, h^ ¼ h01ð0Þ [ h01ðvð1ÞÞ ¼ hL as v
(1) < 0 and h01 is an increasing function.
If v(1/2) < 0, hH [ h^ so that whenever h0 is such that h^ h0\ hH , if the behavioural decision
outcome is the low effort and low aspirations pair, given that a rational decision outcome is the
high effort, high aspirations pair, the individual is necessarily choosing an effort and aspiration
pair that is strictly welfare dominated.
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If v(1/2) ≥ 0, hH  h^ so that if the behavioural decision outcome is the low effort and low
aspirations pair, given that a rational decision outcome is also the low effort, low aspirations pair,
a behavioural outcome is not welfare dominated.
Appendix B. Two Examples of Value Functions
We show two specific formulations of the value function that satisfy A2 on v.
B.1. An S-shaped Value Function
An example of such a value function satisfying A2 is v(x) = ax3 + kx where a < 0 and k > 0.
By computation, v 0(0) = k, v 0 0(0) = 0, v 0(x)  v 0 0(x)(1  x) = 3ax2 + k  6ax(1  x) and
v(1/2) = a/8 + k/2, so that when 0 < k < a/4, v 0(0) > 0, v 0(x)  v 0 0(x)(1  x) ≥ 0 for all
0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 (the feasible values of x under A4 on the production function for final wealth) and v
(1/2) ≤ 0. Note that since v 0(x) = 3ax2 + k, under the preceding parameter restrictions,
2v 0(x)  v 0 0(x)(1  x) ≥ 0 as well. Finally, note that v 0(0) = k so that whenever k 6¼ 0,
v 0(0) 6¼ 0; therefore, v 0(0) 6¼ 0 on a null set of parameters.
B.2. A Value Function with a Bliss Point
An example of a value function satisfying A2 is v(x) = (x  c)2 where c is the reference point.
When c = 0, v is symmetric over gains and losses. In this case, the effect of the frustration from
falling short of aspirations (underachieving) is equal to the effect of the pleasure from exceeding
aspirations (overachieving). However, a value of c different from zero measures the degree of
asymmetry over gains and losses in the value function. By computation, v 0(x) = 2(x  c),
v 0(x)  v 00(x)(1  x) = 2(1 + c  2x) and v(1/2) = (1/2  c)2 so that when c > 0, c 6¼ 1/2,
v 0(0) > 0, v 0(x)  v 00(x)(1  x) ≥ 0, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2 (the feasible values of x under A4 on the
production function for final wealth) and v(1/2) < 0 . In addition, when c > 1/2, v 0(x) > 0 for
all feasible values of x so that if v 0(x)  v 00(x)(1  x) ≥ 0, it follows that 2v 0(x)  v 00(x)
(1  x) ≥ 0 as well. Finally, note that v 0(0) = 2c so that whenever c 6¼ 0, v 0(0) 6¼ 0 as well;
therefore, v 0(0) 6¼ 0 on a null set of parameters.
Appendix C. Extensions
We now consider some extensions to our basic model with a view to shedding light on the
generality of our model and addressing some additional issues.
C.1. Extension 1: Alternative Specification of the Production Function for Final Wealth
We examine how our formal analysis changes when the production function for final wealth has a
more general form than the one specified in Assumption (4). Consider the following assumption:
Assumption 40 (A40). f (e,h0) = h satisfies the following conditions:
(i) f (0, h0) = h0, if the individual puts in zero effort, his final wealth equals to his initial wealth;
(ii) f (e, h0) is (strictly) increasing and concave in effort at any given level of initial wealth,
that is @f (e,h0)/@e > 0 and @
2f (e,h0)/@e
2 ≤ 0;
(iii) f (e,h0) is (strictly) increasing in initial wealth at any given level of effort, that is @f (e,h0)/
@h0 > 0; and
(iv) effort and initial wealth are complements in the production function for final wealth
(i.e. @2f (e,h0)/@e@h0 > 0).
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The production function specified in Assumption (4) also satisfies Assumption (40) but not
necessarily vice versa. How robust are our results to A40 ?
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2. The proofs of these two results need @f (e,h0)/@e > 0 (A40 (ii)).
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 need that @f (e,h0)/
@e > 0, @2f (e,h0)/@e
2 ≤ 0, f (0,h0) = h0 (A40 (i) and A40 (ii)).
Proposition 1. Proposition 1 shows that @2s/@e@h0 ≥ 0. For this to be true under Assumption
A40, we require r(h) < 1. Now, if we assume a more general functional form of f (e, h0) under A40
it should be as before in proposition 3 and 4 the restriction on r(h) that makes Proposition 1
hold will be more general too. An argument along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1
establishes that there exists a unique rational solution level of effort and aspirations ðe^ðh0Þ; g^ ðh0ÞÞ
which is increasing in h0 provided that b 0(h)(1  r(h)/e(h)) ≥ 0 where
eðhÞ ¼
f ðe; h0Þ @
2f
@e@h0
@f
@e
@f
@h0
:
Now, (@2f /@e@h0)/(@f /@e) is the percentage change in the marginal product of effort in the
production of final wealth due to an increase of the level of initial wealth and (@f /@h0)/f (e,h0) is
the percentage change in final wealth due an increase in the level of final wealth. Therefore, e(h)
is the elasticity of the marginal product of effort in the production of final wealth with respect to
an increase in the level of initial wealth. Note that under A4, by computation, e(h) = 1 and this
allowed us to simplify the exposition of our model.
Lemma 2, Lemma 3, Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. Define f (1, h0) = kf(0,h0) = kh0 and
(with a slight abuse of notation) let h(h0) = b(kh0)  b(h0)  c. Then, as in Lemma 2, h 0(h0) > 0
if and only if r(h) < 1 for all h > 0. Note that neither the statement nor the proof of Lemma 3
and Proposition 5 change. However, now the statement of Proposition 6 has to be changed so
that whenever v(k  1/k) < 0 a behavioural poverty trap is welfare dominated.
To summarise, all our results, with two exceptions, continue to hold with this more general
assumption on the production function. The precise statements of two of our results
(specifically, Proposition 1 and Proposition 6) change and require different assumptions on
preferences. However, under these assumptions, we obtain a characterisation of a standard and
behavioural poverty trap along the lines of Proposition 5 and 6 above.
C.2. Extension 2: Allowing for an Aspirations Gap
A key feature in the specification of our model is that effort and aspirations are required to be
mutually consistent at any solution to a BDP: this precludes the possibility of an aspirations gap at
a behavioural (or rational) solution. Here, we point out how we can extend our model to allow
for an aspirations gap and discuss how our formal analysis extends to this case.
Let G0 denote an initial aspiration level that is fixed exogenously; this could reflect
environmental and internal factors (already discussed above) that are exogenous to the
individual. Instead of assuming that at a solution to the individual’s decision-problem aspirations
equal final wealth, we could assume that aspirations equal some convex combination of final
wealth and the initial exogenously determined level of aspirations, that is
g ¼ kf ðe; h0Þ þ ð1 kÞG0:
In this case, clearly, there is the possibility of an aspirations gap even at a consistent effort–action
pair (e, g) we have
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g  G0 ¼ kðf ðe; h0Þ  G0Þ:
By appropriately modifying the definition of a consistent effort–aspiration pair, we can then
extend the existing definitions of a rational and a behavioural solution in an obvious way.
The model (and its associated results) studied in the main body of the article corresponds to
the case where k = 1. At the other extreme, when k = 0 aspirations are always equal to the initial
exogenously determined aspiration G0: in this case, a behavioural and a rational solution always
coincide. Generically, there is an aspirations gap; but importantly, there is no possibility of an
aspirations failure in the sense studied in this article. However, for an arbitrary value of k
between zero and one, our results do not go through without further strengthening the
assumptions made in our model. In sum, our results are robust to small changes in the value of k
below one. They would not hold, however, for any arbitrary value of k between zero and one
without further strengthening the assumptions made in our model.
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